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I. INTRODUCTION
In his classic work The Scarlet Letter, Nathaniel Hawthorne walks
through the trials and tribulations of Hester Prynne, a woman found
guilty of committing adultery in colonial New England.1 After her
conviction, the townspeople parade Hester through the town with a
scarlet “A” sewn to her chest, indicating to all who came into contact
with her that she was an adulteress.2 Eventually, Hester leaves the
colony with her daughter in tow to make a life for the both of them in
England.3 However, Hester later returns to New England so that she
may be buried next to the man who was the object of her forbidden
passion, beneath a tombstone marked with the letter “A.”4
The modern criminal justice system has come a long way since the
days of Hester Prynne. While methods like those used in the Haw-
thorne classic are no longer explicitly used to discourage and punish
activities society deems unacceptable, some argue there are certain
elements of our modern penal system that too closely resemble the
† 2016 graduate of Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to thank
my lovely wife Amy for all her support while writing this paper, through three years
of law school, and through all the twists and turns our life has taken together.
1. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 69–71 (Ticknor, Reed, &
Fields) (1850).
2. Id. at 59, 61.
3. Id. at 303–04.
4. Id. at 305, 307.
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shameful practices illustrated in Hawthorne’s work. In particular,
some claim that the sex offender registry (“SOR”) is a modern-day
scarlet letter, which carries with it certain negative collateral conse-
quences that are far more detrimental to society than any positives the
SORs provide.
Many people have written scholarly articles highlighting the pros
and cons of SORs. Some have taken the analysis a step further by
pointing out the impact SORs have on the values of homes in the
vicinity of a registered sex offender (“RSO”). While these studies
have pointed out the impact the presence of an RSO can have on the
property value for an individual homeowner, research regarding the
impact RSOs have on property tax revenue for taxing districts is non-
existent. This Article highlights the correlation between the depres-
sive effect the presence of RSOs has on property values, the impact
this reduction in property value has on property tax revenue for taxing
districts in Texas, and, as a corollary, the negative impact the decrease
in revenue could have on the government’s ability to provide vital
public services.
The Article concludes by discussing different strategies states like
Texas could use to allow taxing districts to recover some of this lost
revenue. In particular, this Article suggests that states like Texas could
(1) charge RSOs a premium on their property taxes to offset any
losses their presence in the community causes; (2) pass laws that pre-
vent RSOs from living in certain areas; (3) adjust the criteria used by
taxing districts to appraise residential property; or (4) increase mini-
mum sentences for sex offenders in an effort to reduce the number of
registered sex offenders in the community.
A. History of Sex Offender Registration
In 1994 the state of New Jersey passed Megan’s Law after seven-
year-old Megan Kanka was raped and murdered by her neighbor,
Jesse Timmendequas.5 Timmendequas, a convicted sex offender, lured
Megan into the home he shared with two other convicted sex offend-
ers by promising to give her a puppy.6 No one, including Megan’s par-
ents, knew three convicted sex offenders lived in the neighborhood.7
Acting under the belief that public knowledge of Timmendequas’
criminal past could have prevented this tragedy, the State passed legis-
lation requiring sex offenders to register with the State so that police
5. 20 Years Later, Megan Kanka’s Legacy Lives On, 6ABC ACTION NEWS
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and the citizenry could readily find out when a sex offender moves
into their neighborhood.8
In the same year, the United States Congress passed the Jacob Wet-
terling Act, “mandating that each state keep a registry of violent sex
offenders against children readily accessible by police.”9 Two years
later Congress amended the Wetterling Act, making the registries
public and requiring community notification when an offender moves
into an area.10 In 2006, in an effort to “protect the public from sex
offenders and offenders against children,” Congress passed the Adam
Walsh Act, which established a “comprehensive national system for
the registration” of sex offenders whose victims were under the age of
fourteen.11 Title I of the Walsh Act is the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (“SORNA”), which requires lifetime registration
for those convicted of certain sexual crimes.12 As a result of these
laws, there are currently 843,260 RSOs in the United States.13
B. Criticism of Registration Laws
Critics of SORs claim that, while registration seems like a good idea
on its face, registration requirements actually harm the communities
they were intended to protect.14 In particular, critics claim the “scarlet
letter” effect registries have on offenders make finding work and suit-
able housing incredibly difficult, if not impossible for many offenders,
leaving them with no motivation to avoid reoffending.15 Furthermore,
critics assert that most sexual offenses go unreported, and the regis-
tries, therefore, give communities a “false sense of security.”16 In this
same vein, critics claim registration laws are far too broad because
they do not “divulge the actual facts behind a sexual offense charge,”
a fact which tends to give the public “a false impression that every
sexual offender is a pedophile, rapist, or worse.”17 For example, critics
claim that lumping an eighteen-year-old boy who is caught having sex
with his sixteen-year-old girlfriend by his girlfriend’s angry parent into




11. Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (West 2006).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 16915 (West 2006).
13. NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, MAP OF REGISTERED SEX
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES (June 1, 2015), http://www.missingkids.com/
en_US/documents/Sex_Offenders_Map.pdf#page=1.
14. Deborah Jacobs, Why Sex Offender Laws Do More Harm than Good, ACLU
N.J., https://www.aclu-nj.org/theissues/criminaljustice/whysexoffenderlawsdomoreha/
(last visited June 16, 2015).
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Teke Wiggin, Sex Offender Data Threatening Home Values, Tarnishing Neigh-
borhoods and Frustrating Real Estate Agents, INMAN.COM (Apr. 25, 2014), http://
www.inman.com/2014/04/25/sex-offender-data-threatening-home-values-tarnishing-
neighborhoods-and-frustrating-real-estate-agents/.
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a database that contains hardened sexual predators, makes it very
“difficult for the public to differentiate and know who is truly danger-
ous.”18 In sum, critics hold fast to the claim that the registries simply
do not accomplish their intended purpose of reducing the frequency of
sexual crimes, and any good they do accomplish is far outweighed by
the harm inflicted on offenders in particular and society in general.
Despite these criticisms, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
currently maintain searchable databases, indicating that most believe,
as does the Department of Justice, that the registries are “important
for public safety purposes” and “[provide] important information
about convicted sex offenders to local and federal authorities and the
public.”19 Bolstering this mindset, a Department of Justice sponsored
study of the South Carolina registry highlighted the “positive impact
on general deterrence associated with averting” first-time sexual of-
fenses at the rate of three per month, while at the same time conced-
ing that the registry has had “no effect on deterring the risk of sexual
recidivism.”20 Seeing as the registries are a relatively new phenome-
non, time will ultimately tell whether they truly accomplish their
stated goal of “protect[ing] the public from sex offenders.”21
II. REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS AND PROPERTY VALUES
While experts disagree on the efficacy of SORs, one aspect of the
SORs on which experts do agree is the depressive impact SORs have
on residential property values. A 2006 National Bureau of Economic
Research paper by Leigh Linden and Jonah Rockoff, known in aca-
demic circles as the “Rockoff Report,” provides a detailed statistical
analysis of the relationship between the proximity of a residential
property to a property occupied by an RSO and the value of that
property in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.22 Using the widely
accepted assumption that there is an “inverse relationship between
18. Dan Gunderson, Sex Offender Laws Have Unintended Consequences,
MPRNEWS (June 18, 2007) (quoting Jill Levenson), http://www.mprnews.org/story/
2007/06/11/sexoffender1; A twelve-year-old arrested for inappropriately touching his
eight-year-old sister is required to register as a sex offender until the age of 31. See
DePrang, supra note 8 (discussing other questionable qualifications for sex
offenders).
19. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and-notification-
act-sorna (last updated June 3, 2015).
20. ELIZABETH J. LETOURNEAU, ET AL., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION POLICIES FOR REDUCING SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 4 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231
989.pdf.
21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (West 2006).
22. See Leigh L. Linden & Jonah E. Rockoff, There Goes the Neighborhood? Esti-
mates of the Impact of Crime Risk on Property Values From Megan’s Laws, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12253, 2006), http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w12253.
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property values and local crime rates,” the study endeavors to remove
some of the variables inherent in previous studies by evaluating prop-
erty value trends before and after an RSO moves into a neighbor-
hood.23 Using this framework, Rockoff and Linden found that the
value of “homes sold closest to the [registered] offender declined by
four percent” and “homes directly adjacent to an offender declined in
value by twelve percent,” which is similar to the decline seen with
homes located within a “cancer cluster.”24
The report also found that property values recover once a property
is .10 miles or more away from an offender.25 Specifically, Linden and
Rockoff found that homes located within .05 miles of an offender sold
for $145,000 prior to the offender moving into the area and sold for
$125,000 after the offender moved in.26 Rockoff and Linden con-
cluded “the arrival of a sex offender has a statistically and economi-
cally significant impact on the value of the homes in the immediate
vicinity,” costing homeowners in Mecklenburg County around $60
million in lost property value.27 Based on these findings, it would be
reasonable to surmise that residents would be “willing to pay a high
cost,” up to $60 million for the residents of Mecklenburg County, to
keep sex offenders out of their neighborhoods and protect property
values.28
Another more recent study by Susan Yeh at George Mason Univer-
sity School of Law, found the presence of RSOs had a similar effect
on residential property in Lancaster County, Nebraska.29 Unlike
Rockoff and Linden, however, Yeh highlighted the fact that proper-
ties located within .10 miles of an offender take longer to sell than
those located in areas where offenders tend not to reside.30 This find-
ing is bolstered by a 2013 Longwood University report which posits
the true source of decreased property values due to the presence of
RSOs is the fact that houses located near RSOs tend to take longer to
sell, decreasing the amount buyers are willing to pay for these
homes.31 The reason a house usually sells for less the longer it sits on
23. Id. at 1–2.
24. Id. at 3–4, 22.
25. Id. at 22.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 23–24, 30.
28. See id. at 30.
29. See Susan Yeh, Revealing the Rapist Next Door: Property Impacts of a Sex
Offender Registry, 44 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42, 43, 53 (2015). (Yeh found that
“prices for houses whose offender had recently moved away” ended up being 4.96%
higher than “houses that still [had] an offender nearby, but added that “house prices
rebound after an offender moves away.”).
30. Id. at 24.
31. XUN BIAN ET AL, NEIGHBORHOOD TIPPING AND SORTING DYNAMICS IN REAL
ESTATE: EVIDENCE FROM THE VIRGINIA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY, SSRN 3 (April 1,
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338223 (The presence of
an RSO within 0.1 miles resulted in “an 80% increase in the time” it took for a prop-
erty to sell); see also YEH, supra note 29.
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the market is because when a savvy buyer sees a house that has been
on the market for a long period of time they begin to ask questions
and make negative assumptions about the property’s or surrounding
area’s condition. This may lead the buyer to do more research into
why the house has not sold, which could lead them to discover the
presence of a sex offender nearby. The fact is that there are buyers
willing to accept the risk of living near a sex offender, but, as with any
buyer of a good, they expect a discounted price for taking on the risk
associated with the purchase.
The Rockoff Report, the Yeh report, and the Longwood University
report support the claim that the presence of RSOs adversely affects
residential property values in the nearby area. No one, however, has
addressed what to do about the depressive effect RSOs have on prop-
erty values. In particular, this Article seeks to determine what states,
and their taxing districts, can do to recover the lost property tax reve-
nue resulting from the depressive effect RSOs have on property
values.
A. Basics of the Property Tax in Texas
In 2015, Texans paid an average of $3,327 in property taxes, which
was the fifth highest average amount in the United States.32 In order
to calculate the amount of the tax for each property, the Texas Consti-
tution establishes that taxing districts shall tax non-exempt real prop-
erty in proportion to the property’s value.33 Section 23.01 of the Texas
Tax Code further provides that “all taxable property is appraised at its
market value as of January 1.”34 Generally, market value is the price a
willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept for a prop-
erty, neither being under any compulsion to do so. The Code goes a
little deeper than the general definition by ordering “each property
shall be appraised based on the individual characteristics that affect
the property’s value and all available evidence that is specific to the
value of the property shall be taken into account in determining the
property’s market value.”35 The Texas Comptroller’s website provides
that one of the methods taxing districts can use to determine market
value is to compare the property to other properties sold in the area.36
While there is nothing that indicates tax assessors include the pres-
ence or proximity of sex offenders as an “individual characteristic” of
a property’s market value, the accessibility of information on the loca-
32. Carol Christian, Texas Property Taxes Among the Nation’s Highest, HOUS.
CHRON., http://www.chron.com/homes/article/Texas-property-taxes-among-the-na
tion-s-highest-6181429.php (last updated Apr. 6, 2015).
33. TEX. CONST. art. 8, § 1(b) (West 2016).
34. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01(a) (West 2016).
35. Id. at § 23.01(b).
36. GLENN HEGAR, TEX. COMPTROLLER PUB. ACCTS., PROPERTY TAX ADMINIS-
TRATION IN TEXAS 1 (January 2016), http://comptroller.texas.gov/taxinfo/proptax/pdf/
96-1738.pdf.
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tion of sex offenders has increasingly caused such considerations to
enter the calculus of many potential homebuyers. Since tax assessors
in Texas use the market value of a property to determine its taxable
value, any discount a buyer may require due to the fact that an RSO
lives nearby conceivably decreases the taxable value of the property
and other properties in the area, which decreases the amount of prop-
erty tax paid on that property.
B. Distribution of Revenue in Texas
Having established that the presence of RSOs has a negative impact
on property values and, as a result, property tax revenue, it is impor-
tant to understand how a reduction in revenue affects taxing districts.
In Texas, each of the following governmental entities can levy prop-
erty taxes: cities, counties, school districts, and special purpose dis-
tricts, e.g., municipal utility districts, emergency services districts,
hospital districts, water control districts, and college districts.37 In
2010, these entities collected a total of $40.28 billion in property tax
levies, with $6.76 billion going to cities, $6.57 billion going to counties,
$21.56 billion going to school districts, and $5.39 billion going to spe-
cial purpose districts.38
Unlike states that depend on income tax as their main source of
revenue, states like Texas, which do not have a state income tax and
look to property taxes as a means to provide government services, are
highly susceptible to market forces that decrease the value of residen-
tial property, and, as a result, property tax revenue. Because such neg-
ative market forces have a significant impact on the ability of states
like Texas to provide basic services to its citizens, states like Texas,
need to proactively seek out ways to either recover lost revenue due
to the presence of RSOs or come up with a way to eliminate the im-
pact RSOs have on property value.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE REVENUE PROBLEM
In an article addressing the effect of government-imposed land use
restrictions on property value and property tax revenue, Bethany Ber-
ger discusses the “fiscal illusion” that state governments should com-
pensate property owners for government-imposed land use
restrictions that negatively impact property values.39 Berger suggests
that governments “already feel the costs of actions that reduce the
value or productivity of the property” in the form of lost tax revenue
and requiring the government to compensate owners for lost property
37. SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER PUB. ACCTS., YOUR MONEY AND THE
TAXING FACTS 4 (Aug., 2012), http://www.texastransparency.org/Special_Features/
Reports/pdf/TexasItsYourMoney-TaxingFacts.pdf.
38. Id. at 6.
39. BETHANY R BERGER, THE ILLUSION OF FISCAL ILLUSION IN REGULATORY
TAKINGS, SSRN 2 (NOV. 12, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2689954.
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value is illusory because doing so will “add a new and much larger cost
to the action.”40 In discussing options other than directly compensat-
ing property owners for lost value due to land use restrictions, Berger
goes on to say that “[l]ocal governments, which rely heavily on prop-
erty taxes, will be most sensitive to land use restrictions that reduce
the assessed value of property, state governments will be less so, and
federal governments still less so,” leaving each entity with differing
levels of motivation to address the negative impact their respective
policies have on property value and the associated negative implica-
tions for property tax revenue.41
While SORs are not a land use restriction in the sense of those to
which the Berger article refers, SORs are a form of government regu-
lation that inadvertently affects the value of property and property tax
revenue. Because SORs create RSOs and because RSOs have a docu-
mented depressive effect on property value, SORs have a very similar
effect to the land use restrictions highlighted in the Berger article. The
loss of property tax revenue due to the presence of RSOs could make
it difficult for local governments to adequately provide the services
their citizens expect, e.g., schools, hospitals, roadways, emergency ser-
vices, etc.42 However, states and the federal government, that have
multiple sources of revenue, e.g., sales tax, income tax, estate tax, etc.,
are less likely to feel the pain a loss in property tax revenue inflicts.
Furthermore, Berger points out that since “policy-setting, imple-
mentations, and budget management responsibilities are often divided
among” different semi-autonomous government offices, the loss of
revenue “may not be experienced by the same people that caused
them, limiting their effect on political behavior.”43 In the RSO con-
text, sex-offender laws are enacted by state governments and the fed-
eral government, but since property taxes are collected and used
mainly on the local level, state governments and the federal govern-
ment rarely experience the negative fiscal consequences of their poli-
cies regarding RSOs.
Finally, Berger highlights the fact that politicians are not driven by
“[r]evenue generation” but by votes, and, “while revenue losses . . .
may affect political goals, they don’t necessarily.”44 Berger claims this
is true because “governmental actors are less interested in maximizing
governmental budgets than in maximizing political power to secure
reelection.”45 Both the federal and state governments have estab-
lished that the goal regarding sex offenders is to monitor them post
incarceration in order keep the public safe from those offenders who
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 4.
42. COMBS, supra note 37 at 4.
43. BERGER, supra note 39, at 24.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 23.
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might recidivate.46 This is a great campaign slogan because it is one
that makes voters feel like the associated politician is looking out for
their safety. However, the reality may be that a constituency feeling
physically safe, i.e., by being informed about the presence of RSOs,
can only be achieved at the expense of security on the fiscal front, in
the form of lost property tax revenue. Because the revenue problem
highlighted in this Article is a problem caused by actions both at the
state and federal level, and the local government level, any solution
will require the cooperation of all of the relevant government enti-
ties.47 The remainder of this Article will discuss the potential solutions
to the revenue problem, and conclude with a suggestion as to which
option(s) the respective government entities should implement.
A. The Offender’s Premium
One option to recover revenue may be for taxing districts to charge
RSOs a premium on their property taxes to make up for any reduc-
tion in tax revenue their presence in a community causes. American
jurisprudence is full of examples of civil penalties criminals continue
to pay long after they have served time for their crimes, which are not
considered criminal punishments, even though the civil penalty is in-
curred as a result of a criminal conviction.48 For example, the Supreme
Court has held that sex offender registration laws themselves do not
impose criminal punishments. In Smith v. Doe I, et al, the Court, in
deciding whether requiring offenders convicted prior to the passage of
registration laws was an ex post facto criminal punishment, found that
a law requiring sexual offenders to register on a public registry did not
constitute a criminal punishment because it was “an incident of the
state’s power to protect the health and safety of its citizens” and was
not intended by the legislature to “add to the punishment.”49 The
Court also held that “even if the objective of the Act is consistent with
the purposes of the Alaska criminal justice system, the State’s pursuit
of it in a regulatory scheme does not make the objective punitive.”50
Finally, in response to claims that the stigma the registry inflicts is
evidence of its punitive quality, the Court held that any stigma that
may result from a person being on the registry stems from the “dis-
46. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (West 2006).
47. See generally id.; BERGER, supra note 39, at 4 (“[G]overnments and their con-
stituents need to feel both the costs and benefits of governmental action in order to
make efficient decisions.”).
48. See Administrative License Revocation (ALR) Program, TEX. DEP’T PUB.
SAFETY, https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/DriverLicense/alr.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2016) (explaining persons suspected of driving while intoxicated in Texas “may have
their driver license suspended from 90 days to 2 years,” regardless of any criminal
penalties they may incur as a result of a subsequent conviction).
49. Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 93–94 (2003) (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 616 (1960)).
50. Id. at 94.
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semination of accurate information about a criminal record” and that
where “the state does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma
an integral part of the regulatory scheme” no criminal punishment has
occurred.51 While still deemed penalties, the Court held civil penalties,
like sex offender registration, are not considered punitive because
their primary purpose is to “protect the public,” and not to punish or
deter crime.52
Based on the precedent set by the Court in Smith, states could re-
quire RSOs to pay a premium on their property taxes. Courts would
likely consider such a law to be a valid civil penalty because its pri-
mary purpose is to protect the public from the negative economic con-
sequences of having RSOs in a taxing district and is not intended to
add to the punishment of the RSO. However, practically speaking,
this solution on its own would not likely solve the problem because
many offenders have a very difficult time finding steady work after
being released from confinement.53 This makes it difficult for many
offenders to maintain steady income, and, as such, the increased bur-
den of a property tax premium may be more than many offenders can
bear, giving them little motivation not to reoffend.54
B. Banishment Zones
In an effort to reduce the presence of sex offenders in their commu-
nities, some cities and states have sought to pass laws making it ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, for RSOs to find adequate housing.
A Georgia law, which sought to make it illegal for RSOs to live or
work within 1,000 feet of “a place where children might assemble,”
was deemed to violate the U.S. Constitution after the construction of
a day care center within 1,000 feet of an RSO’s property line forced
the RSO to move.55 The author of the bill, State Representative Jerry
Keen, unashamedly proclaimed that the underlying intent of his bill
was to make the restriction so onerous that “offenders ‘will want to
move to another state.’”56 The RSO claimed this was an unlawful tak-
ing in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution, and the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed.57 The court held
51. Id. at 98–99.
52. Emily DePrang, Criminal Court Punts on ‘Retroactive Punishment’ Question,
TEX. OBSERVER (Mar. 31, 2014, 12:59 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/texas-
court-criminal-appeals-retroactive-civil-penalties/.
53. Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Consequences of Sex Of-
fender Residency Restrictions, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 531, 532–33 (2007) (explain-
ing that “42% [of offenders] lost a job as a result of registration”).
54. See Jacobs, supra note 14 (explaining that “when nothing works out - job,
home, family-individuals are more likely to give up and reoffend”).
55. Peter Whoriskey, Georgia Court Rejects Law on Sex Offenders, WASH. POST
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that the law made it so that “there is no place in Georgia where a
registered sex offender can live without continually being at risk of
being ejected,” turning the entire state of Georgia into a so-called
“banishment zone.”58
Some claim that these types of banishment-zone laws make it in-
creasingly difficult for RSOs to re-acclimate to life outside of prison.
Richard Tewksbury, a professor of Justice Administration at the Uni-
versity of Louisville, claims that “the difficulty RSOs experience in
locating and maintaining safe, affordable, and legal housing” makes it
extremely difficult for them “to reintegrate into communities as law-
abiding residents.”59 Tewksbury and other critics claim banishment-
zone laws, rather than accomplishing their stated purpose of “maxi-
mizing public safety and deterring sexual offenses,” may actually
make life so difficult for RSOs that the stress the laws cause may drive
RSOs to seek ways to relieve their stress, including committing new
sexual offenses.60
Deborah Jacobs of the ACLU of New Jersey echoes these senti-
ments by claiming “[b]anishment zone laws may likely force sexual
offenders to move from environments in which they have support net-
works into other communities in which they have no support.”61 Ja-
cobs goes on to say that this state of affairs puts residents in the “new
communities at risk” because offenders without adequate support net-
works are more likely to reoffend.62 Residency restrictions also push
RSOs “to the fringes of society, forcing them to live in motels, out of
cars or under bridges,” making it very difficult for law enforcement to
keep track of where they are located, effectively defeating one of the
original purposes behind the SORNA law.63
Some state courts, following the lead of states like Georgia and re-
sponding to the criticisms voiced by those that agree with Tewksbury
and Jacobs, have begun to push back against banishment-zone laws
that bar RSOs from living in certain areas.64 In Massachusetts, the
Supreme Judicial Court upheld a lower court ruling that a city ordi-
nance preventing level two and three RSOs from living “within 1,000
feet of a school or park” violated the Massachusetts state constitu-
tion.65 The ordinance effectively prohibited certain RSOs from “es-
tablishing residence, or even spending the night in a shelter, in ninety-
58. Id.
59. Tewksbury, supra note 53 at 534, 537.
60. Id. at 538, 540.
61. Jacobs, supra note 14.
62. Id.
63. See Editorial Board, The Pointless Banishment of Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/opinion/the-pointless-banishment-
of-sex-offenders.html.
64. See id.
65. Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18, 20 (Mass. 2015).
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five percent of the residential properties” in the city of Lynn.66 The
court compared laws that created large banishment zones for sex of-
fenders to laws that allowed “whole communities of persons, such as
Native Americans or Japanese-Americans [to] be lawfully banished
from our midst” in the past.67
Ultimately, the court held that under the Home Rule amendment to
the Massachusetts state constitution, which prevents cities from imple-
menting laws that conflict with the stated policy position of the state
legislature, the city lacked the authority to establish such an ordinance
because the state legislature never intended to give cities in the state
authority to establish laws regarding “sex offender residency op-
tions.”68 While Massachusetts did have some laws regarding residency
restrictions for RSOs at the state level, the court highlighted the fact
that the state legislature had “limited its restriction to those offenders
seeking to reside in an integrated setting with a vulnerable popula-
tion,” like a long-term care facility.69 The court went on to note that
the legislature did not intend to restrict the residency of “those seek-
ing to reside geographically close to a vulnerable population,” and, as
such, the city of Lynn could not implement a law with broader resi-
dency restrictions.70
California courts have also held that a blanket residency restriction
that prevented sex offenders from living “within 2000 feet of any pub-
lic or private school, or park where children regularly gather” was un-
constitutional.71 In in re Taylor, the plaintiffs, all sex offenders on
parole, claimed this law unconstitutionally restricted their “privacy
rights, property rights, right to intrastate travel and substantive due
process” making it virtually impossible for them to find affordable
compliant housing in San Diego County.72 The court acknowledged
that while a parolee’s rights are limited, parole conditions must not
impede “those basic, albeit limited, constitutional rights.”73 The court
found that the blanket residency restriction “imposed harsh and se-
vere restrictions and disabilities on the affected parolees’ liberty and
privacy rights” by making 97% of the rental property in San Diego
County unavailable to them.74
Additionally, the court held the law produced “conditions that ham-
per, rather than foster efforts to monitor, supervise, and rehabilitate”
66. Id.
67. Id. at 25.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id.
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (West 2006), invalidated by In re Taylor, 343 P.3d
867 (Cal. 2015).
72. In re Taylor, 343 P.3d at 870–71.
73. Id. at 882.
74. Id. at 876, 879.
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RSOs because homeless RSOs are harder to surveil and supervise.75
However, the court did not abolish residency restrictions altogether.
The court provided that residency restrictions can be imposed on pa-
rolees that are “more or less restrictive” than the restriction in the
California law as long as the restriction imposed is “based on, and
supported by, the particularized circumstances of each individual
parolee.”76
It makes sense on its face to keep RSOs away from areas where
they might be tempted to reoffend (one would not suggest, after all, to
an alcoholic that they live right next door to a bar), but the legal trend
seems to be moving away from broad residency restriction laws, while
still leaving room for corrections officials to restrict residency as nec-
essary for individual RSOs. Because RSOs tend to reside in areas that
“are more socio-economically disadvantaged, with higher poverty and
unemployment rates and a lower percentage of college graduates,”
forcing these already struggling areas to shoulder alone the negative
affects RSOs can have on tax revenue by banishing RSOs from more
desirable areas could work to hasten the decline of an already declin-
ing community.77 As such, states and taxing districts should not look
to residency restrictions alone to solve the property tax revenue
problem.
C. Adjust Appraisal Criteria
Currently, there is no literature or research indicating Texas tax as-
sessors include the presence of RSOs, or lack thereof, in their assessed
value calculation for a residential property. However, there is some
precedent from other states for assessors including the presence of
RSOs in their appraisal criteria.78 In an article entitled When Sex
Doesn’t Sell: Mitigating the Damaging Effect of Megan’s Law on Prop-
erty Values, Suzann Hartzell-Baird discusses the fact that some prop-
erty tax assessors have been willing to reduce the assessed value of a
property based on the presence of nearby RSOs.79 She points out that
while “[n]o per se rule exists for determining how much” the presence
of an RSO affects property value, the increasing amount of research
on the subject gives homeowners “better empirical data to demon-
strate the potential financial impact” RSOs living nearby have on a
property.80 While Hartzell-Baird looks at the property value issue
75. Id. at 879, 882.
76. Id. at 869.
77. Yeh, supra note 29 at 16; See also, Tewksbury, supra note 53 at 535 (explaining
that while RSOs are found in all kinds of neighborhoods, “they are particularly likely
to reside in areas characterized by economic disadvantage, lack of physical resources,
relatively little social capital, and high levels of social disorganization”).
78. See Suzanna Hartzell-Baird, When Sex Doesn’t Sell: Mitigating the Damaging
Effect of Megan’s Law on Property Values, 35 REAL EST. L. J. 353, 370 (2006).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 371.
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from the taxpayer perspective, taxing entities could use the same data
to properly value the homes in their districts.
As noted above, the Texas Tax Code does leave some discretion in
the hands of taxing districts as to how the taxable value of a property
is determined.81 Taxing districts in Texas could use the discretion
given to them within the statutory scheme to properly decrease or in-
crease the value of a property based on the presence of RSOs nearby,
or lack thereof. At first glance, one might think that this would only
exacerbate the problem by reducing the value of a property at the
outset because an RSO resides nearby instead of allowing market
forces to determine the appropriate reduction in value. However, as
with any change to a taxing system, there would be a corresponding
increase in revenue to make up for this reduction.
According to Yeh, since RSOs tend to reside in areas that have
higher unemployment and poverty rates, adjusting the appraisal crite-
ria to account for the presence or absence of RSOs in an area would
effectively provide a tax cut for those economically disadvantaged ar-
eas that tend to attract RSOs and levy a tax increase on those more
affluent areas that tend not to house RSOs.82 For a home in an afflu-
ent area worth $500,000, a 4% increase in assessed value will raise the
property’s value by $20,000. Conversely, a 4% decrease in the value of
a home in an economically disadvantaged area worth $100,000 will
decrease that property’s value by $4,000. This scenario results in a
$16,000 net increase in property value for the taxing district. If this
$16,000 net increase in property value were multiplied by the average
property tax rate for Texans of 2.18%, the taxing district would see a
net increase in property tax revenue of $348.80.83 While this does not
seem like much, this increase in revenue adds up as it is applied across
the board to all the homes in the district. Such an approach would
mean an increase in the overall revenue for that district, while at the
same time making homes in the poorer area slightly more affordable
by lowering the property tax burden.
Taxing districts should not rely on this strategy too heavily, how-
ever, because the use of data can cut both ways. Hartzell-Baird con-
cedes that the proliferation of data regarding the location of sex
offenders has made it difficult to find a property that does not have
RSOs “living or working nearby.”84 While many see the availability of
81. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.0(a)–(b) (West 2016).
82. Yeh, supra note 29 at 16.
83. Jennifer Von Pohlmann, Property Tax Rates Highest for Homeowners Who
Have Owned Between Five and 15 Years, Own High-End or Low-End Homes,
REALTYTRAC (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.realtytrac.com/news/home-prices-and-sales/
property-tax-rates-highest-for-homeowners-who-have-owned-between-five-and-15-
years-own-high-end-or-low-end-homes/.
84. Hartzell-Baird, supra note 78 at 371; In a 2015 interview, Rockoff noted that
the proliferation of data and new technology and increasingly user-friendly registries
could “presume[ably] magnify discounts” beyond the four percent reduction in value
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\3-2\TWR203.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-JAN-17 14:53
2016] SHOW ME THE MONEY 211
information on the location of RSOs as a positive, Hartzell-Baird
points out that the ease with which this information can be accessed
may make it “difficult for homeowners to demonstrate diminished
property value” due to the presence of an RSO.85 By way of illustra-
tion, if a home is located in a town known to have toxic contamina-
tion, it is going to be very difficult for anyone to establish that the
presence of toxic contamination makes that home worth less than the
surrounding homes because all are equally exposed to the contamina-
tion. Similarly, taxing districts will have a difficult time justifying an
increase or decrease in the value of the properties in their district if
the presence of RSOs is so great that setting a standard for what home
is and is not in the vicinity of an RSO is practically impossible.86 In
short, if all the homes are discounted due to the presence of an RSO,
none of the homes are discounted.
D. Increase Minimum Sentences
While the strategies cited above all deal with the effects the pres-
ence of RSOs have on tax revenue, none of those solutions address
the fact that the surest way of reducing the effect RSOs have on the
public is to reduce the number of RSOs. Simple logic demands one to
concede the surest way to reduce crime in society is to reduce the
number of criminals in society, and the best way to reduce the number
of criminals available to commit crimes against the public is to put
them in prison where it is much more difficult for them to victimize
society.87 Many states and the federal government, in keeping with
this philosophy, have chosen to implement minimum sentence re-
quirements for certain sex crimes, with the federal government requir-
ing mandatory minimum sentences for the following sex-based
offenses:
• Section 1591(b)(1) and (2) require a minimum ten- or fifteen-year
term for sex trafficking of a minor depending on the age of the
victim;88
found in both the Rockoff and Yeh studies mentioned above. In the minds of many
real estate professionals, this prediction by Rockoff is quickly coming to fruition. Real
estate professionals are beginning to recognize that the proliferation of information
on the location of sex offenders on real estate websites and smartphone apps “could
literally bring down property values all over the United States.” Wiggin, supra note
17.
85. Hartzell-Baird, supra note 78 at 371.
86. Id. at 371–72.
87. See William Otis, Like Less Crime? Thank Mandatory Minimums, U.S. NEWS
(Sep. 2, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/09/02/tell-eric-
holder-that-mandatory-minimums-worked-to-reduce-crime (explaining that since
mandatory minimum sentencing was adopted in the 1980s, there has been “a 50%
reduction in crime,” leading to the economic boom enjoyed by the United States over
the past three decades).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)–(2) (2015).
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• Section 2241(c) requires a minimum thirty-year term for traveling
across state lines with the intent to have sex with a child under
twelve years of age or for crossing state lines and having sex with
a child between the ages of twelve and sixteen under certain ag-
gravating circumstances;89
• Sections 2251(e) and 2260(c)(1) require a minimum term of fif-
teen years for production of child pornography and enhanced
minimum terms if such a defendant has a prior felony conviction
for an enumerated sex offense;90
• Section 2251A(a) and (b) require a minimum term of thirty years
for buying or selling, or otherwise transferring, children for the
purpose of participating in the production of child pornography;91
• Section 2422(b) requires a minimum term of ten years for using
mail or facilities or means of commerce to cause a minor to en-
gage in prostitution or other criminal sexual activity;92
• Section 2423(a) requires a minimum term of ten years for trans-
porting a minor in commerce for the purpose of engaging in pros-
titution or other criminal sexual activity;93 and
• Section 3559(e) requires a mandatory life imprisonment for sec-
ond conviction for certain sex offenses against minors.94
Section 3553(b)(2)(A) of Title 18 U.S.C. gives courts the discretion
for sex crimes and crimes against children to either increase or de-
crease the sentence from the mandatory minimum based on the pres-
ence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances.95 This “safety
valve” can work to reduce the impact of mandatory minimum
sentences by putting the discretion in regards to sentencing back in
the hands of the judge.
Texas also has mandatory minimums for certain sexual crimes. For
example, a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years is re-
quired for anyone convicted of aggravated sexual assault where the
victim is under the age of six or where the victim is under the age of
fourteen and “the offense contained threats of serious bodily injury or
use of a deadly weapon.”96 Additionally, if a person over the age of
eighteen is convicted of aggravated sexual assault and has “previously
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2007).
90. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e), 2260(c)(1) (2008).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2251A(a)–(b) (2008).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2015).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) (2015).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A) (2015).
96. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. TEX., PENAL CODE OFFENSES BY PUNISHMENT RANGE 2
(Nov. 2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/cj/penalcode.pdf.
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been convicted of certain violent sexual offenses” that person shall
receive a sentence of life in prison without parole.97
As with any issue of this magnitude, there are those in favor of and
those opposed to mandatory minimum sentencing. A 2014 Heri-
tage.com article discusses the differences between the two sides of the
mandatory minimum debate.98 The article points out that those who
are against mandatory minimums argue that mandatory minimums
put too much power in the hands of prosecutors because the length of
the sentence and the mandatory minimum is based on the crime with
which the prosecutor chooses to charge the offender.99 They further
argue that a one-year sentence has the same deterrent effect as a five-
year sentence, and that the real deterrent effect comes from a desire
not to be arrested.100  According to those who are against mandatory
minimums, the related sentence does not really enter into the calculus
of a person considering whether to commit a crime, and, as such, long
minimum sentences do little to deter crime.101
Those in favor of mandatory minimums argue that legislatures are
generally in a much better position to determine the appropriate pun-
ishment for a crime than is a judge.102 Proponents of mandatory mini-
mums claim that leaving too much power in the hands of a judge when
it comes to sentencing leads to disparity in ranges of punishment for
the same or similar crimes and sentences that are too lenient.103 They
also argue that mandatory minimums give prosecutors leverage in ne-
gotiating with offenders for information that could lead to the appre-
hension of more dangerous criminals. If a prosecutor has the power to
change a charge from one with a twenty-five year mandatory mini-
mum to one with a ten year mandatory minimum or no mandatory
minimum, that offender may be willing to offer the state information
that could lead to the apprehension of a more dangerous person.104
Finally, supporters remind detractors that, while the cost of housing
criminals may increase with mandatory minimums, the decreased cost
to victims, as a result of fewer offenders being on the streets, must also
be taken into consideration.105
If society is truly concerned about the impact RSOs have on a com-
munity, from both a public safety and fiscal perspective, the primary
97. Id. at 5.
98. Evan Bernick & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum
Sentences: The Arguments for and Against Potential Reforms, Legal Memorandum
No. 114, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/
pdf/LM114.pdf.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id.
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defense should not be severe post-incarceration restrictions, like ban-
ishment zones, but instead should be to pass laws that keep sex of-
fenders off the streets for longer periods of time. This reduces the
amount of RSOs available to negatively impact property value and
property tax revenue, while at the same time giving the offenders the
time and treatment they need to have the best shot at rehabilitation.
While this solution may seem harsh to some, the far reaching social
and economic effects of sexual crime, not to mention the impact sex-
ual crime has on the individual victims, warrant the harshest treatment
available.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Berger article suggests, the real problem with implementing
any of these strategies to regain revenue for taxing districts is the fact
that the taxing districts themselves lack the authority to implement or
repeal the registration laws that are costing them millions of dollars in
property value each year.106 Additionally, laws like the Home Rule
Amendment make it difficult for local entities to pass laws aimed at
protecting property values, like banishment-zone laws, if those laws
do not mesh with the policy position that the state’s legislature has
taken regarding RSOs.107 Accordingly, the local, state, and federal
governments will have to work together to reach a solution that satis-
fies their respective interests regarding the monitoring of RSOs and
the generation of revenue through property taxes.
To that end, on the local level, taxing districts could adjust their
appraisal criteria to account for the presence of RSOs, or lack thereof,
in a particular area. In Texas, this change is directly within the purview
of the taxing districts.108 As noted above, this solution will both accu-
rately reflect the value of homes in the more economically disadvan-
taged areas and increase taxes on the more affluent areas where RSOs
tend not to reside. The net increase in revenue would allow taxing
districts to reinvest in those economically disadvantaged areas and po-
tentially allow the property values in those areas to recover over time.
At the same time, states and the federal government could decrease
the number of RSOs available to negatively impact property values by
increasing the minimum sentences for sex offenders. This solution will
106. BERGER, supra note 39, at 24.
107. See Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18, 23 (Mass. 2015) (holding the city’s
regulation of sex offenders violated the “Home Rule Amendment” to the Massachu-
setts state constitution which prevented a municipality from passing a law that contra-
dicted the policy goals of the state legislature); see also David Warren, More Than 20
Texas Towns Repeal Sex Offender Residency Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://www.edgemedianetwork.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=crime&sc3=news&id=19
3134&pf=1 (explaining that some Texas cities are having to repeal municipal sex of-
fender ordinances due to the fact that implementing such ordinances violates the
“Home Rule Amendment” in the Texas state constitution).
108. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01(a)–(b) (West 2016).
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likely increase the cost of incarceration since sex offenders will be in
prison longer. However, voters are more likely to be willing to pay
increased incarceration costs, a cost felt by all taxpayers, rather than
personally take the hit on the value of their residence and potentially
become a victim of a sex crime because of an RSO in the area.
Until the local, state, and federal governments are willing to make
some changes regarding the RSO issue, citizens will increasingly feel
the effects of the presence of RSOs in their neighborhoods through
decreased property value, and, potentially, through a reduction in the
government services property tax revenue is intended to cover. As of
now, the cost has not been great enough to cause the citizenry to call
for the necessary changes, but given the current statutory scheme re-
garding RSOs; the availability of information regarding the location of
RSOs and the fact that there seems to be a proliferation of sex related
crimes in our society, the presence of RSOs and their effect on prop-
erty values and property tax revenue is only likely to increase over
time. As such, governments need to act now to mitigate some of the
effects RSOs produce in order to protect the future social and eco-
nomic wellbeing of the communities that they govern.
